Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-2-5.txt)
Sent 1: Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan.
Sent 2: Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations.
Sent 3: Other governments in the region, such as those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and even Libya, which were targets of some of these groups, added their own pressure.
Sent 4: At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change.
Sent 5: Though Turabi had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989, had never been entirely under his thumb.
Sent 6: Thus as outside pressures mounted, Bashir's supporters began to displace those of Turabi.
Sent 7: The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point.
Sent 8: The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden.
Sent 9: When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996.
Sent 10: A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies.
Sent 11: Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country.
Sent 12: Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him.
Sent 13: Bin Laden also began to have serious money problems.
Sent 14: International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency.
Sent 15: Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds.
Sent 16: As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased.
Sent 17: Saudi pressures on the Bin Laden family also probably took some toll.
Sent 18: In any case, Bin Laden found it necessary both to cut back his spending and to control his outlays more closely.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-34.txt)
Sent 1: At 9:48, a representative from the White House shelter asked if there were any indications of another hijacked aircraft.
Sent 2: The deputy director for operations mentioned the Delta flight and concluded that "that would be the fourth possible hijack."
Sent 3: At 9:49, the commander of NORAD directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.
Sent 4: At 9:59, an Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White House Military Office joined the conference and stated he had just talked to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.
Sent 5: The White House requested (1) the implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for Air Force One, and (3) a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, D.C.
Sent 6: By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been no mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the teleconference.
Sent 7: The President and the Vice President The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9:05, Andrew Card whispered to him: "A second plane hit the second tower.
Sent 8: America is under attack."
Sent 9: The President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis.
Sent 10: The press was standing behind the children; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring.
Sent 11: The President felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening.
Sent 12: The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minutes, while the children continued reading.
Sent 13: He then returned to a holding room shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television coverage.
Sent 14: He next spoke to Vice President Cheney, Dr. Rice, New York Governor George Pataki, and FBI Director Robert Mueller.
Sent 15: He decided to make a brief statement from the school before leaving for the airport.
Sent 16: The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door.
Sent 17: Between 9:15 and 9:30, the staff was busy arranging a return to Washington, while the President consulted his senior advisers about his remarks.
Sent 18: No one in the traveling party had any information during this time that other aircraft were hijacked or missing.
Sent 19: Staff was in contact with the White House Situation Room, but as far as we could determine, no one with the President was in contact with the Pentagon.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-12.txt)
Sent 1: The hijackers attacked at 9:28.
Sent 2: While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet.
Sent 3: Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft.
Sent 4: During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.
Sent 5: The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.
Sent 6: The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here."
Sent 7: On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.
Sent 8: This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001.
Sent 9: But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.
Sent 10: The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams.
Sent 11: They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff.
Sent 12: On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers.
Sent 13: The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August.
Sent 14: Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight.
Sent 15: FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel.
Sent 16: We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight.
Sent 17: All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them.
Sent 18: We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-26.txt)
Sent 1: The new administration had already begun exploring possible diplomatic options, retracing many of the paths traveled by its predecessors.U.S.
Sent 2: envoys again pressed the Taliban to turn Bin Laden "over to a country where he could face justice" and repeated, yet again, the warning that the Taliban would be held responsible for any al Qaeda attacks on U.S. interests.
Sent 3: The Taliban's representatives repeated their old arguments.
Sent 4: Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told us that while U.S. diplomats were becoming more active on Afghanistan through the spring and summer of 2001, "it would be wrong for anyone to characterize this as a dramatic shift from the previous administration."
Sent 5: In deputies meetings at the end of June, Tenet was tasked to assess the prospects forTaliban cooperation with the United States on al Qaeda.
Sent 6: The NSC staff was tasked to flesh out options for dealing with the Taliban.
Sent 7: Revisiting these issues tried the patience of some of the officials who felt they had already been down these roads and who found the NSC's procedures slow."
Sent 8: We weren't going fast enough,"Armitage told us.
Sent 9: Clarke kept arguing that moves against the Taliban and al Qaeda should not have to wait months for a larger review of U.S. policy in South Asia."
Sent 10: For the government," Hadley said to us,"we moved it along as fast as we could move it along."
Sent 11: As all hope in moving the Taliban faded, debate revived about giving covert assistance to the regime's opponents.
Sent 12: Clarke and the CIA's Cofer Black renewed the push to aid the Northern Alliance.
Sent 13: Clarke suggested starting with modest aid, just enough to keep the Northern Alliance in the fight and tie down al Qaeda terrorists, without aiming to overthrow the Taliban.
Sent 14: Rice, Hadley, and the NSC staff member for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, told us they opposed giving aid to the Northern Alliance alone.
Sent 15: They argued that the program needed to have a big part for Pashtun opponents of theTaliban.
Sent 16: They also thought the program should be conducted on a larger scale than had been suggested.
Sent 17: Clarke concurred with the idea of a larger program, but he warned that delay risked the Northern Alliance's final defeat at the hands of the Taliban.
Sent 18: During the spring, the CIA, at the NSC's request, had developed draft legal authorities-a presidential finding-to undertake a large-scale program of covert assistance to the Taliban's foes.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-6.txt)
Sent 1: At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically again.
Sent 2: Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers.
Sent 3: One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English.
Sent 4: The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and she did not know how.
Sent 5: The aircraft was in a rapid descent.
Sent 6: At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first class.
Sent 7: Other flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were reporting the events.
Sent 8: At 8:41, in American's operations center, a colleague told Marquis that the air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and "think he's [American 11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City].
Sent 9: They're moving everybody out of the way.
Sent 10: They seem to have him on a primary radar.
Sent 11: They seem to think that he is descending."
Sent 12: At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong.
Sent 13: About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward, "Something is wrong.
Sent 14: We are in a rapid descent .
Sent 15: we are all over the place."
Sent 16: Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-7.txt)
Sent 1: After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options.
Sent 2: The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it.
Sent 3: For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Laden.
Sent 4: On August 22, the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue with the United States on Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan.
Sent 5: Meeting in Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Taliban delegates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but asked what would happen to Bin Laden should he be sent to Saudi Arabia.
Sent 6: Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Laden, the Taliban leader said no.
Sent 7: Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government.
Sent 8: Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime.
Sent 9: (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late September.
Sent 10: His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received independently.
Sent 11: Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelligence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi custody.
Sent 12: The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained.
Sent 13: Several officials told us, in particular, that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi government in 1997.67Though U.S. officials repeatedly raised the issue, the Saudis provided limited information.
Sent 14: In his September 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Vice President Gore, while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness, renewed the request for direct U.S. access to Tayyib.
Sent 15: The United States never obtained this access.
Sent 16: An NSC staff-led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see "if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent individuals in Saudi Arabia, including especially the Bin Laden family."
Sent 17: One result was two NSC-led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000.
Sent 18: During these trips the NSC, Treasury, and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials, and later interviewed members of the Bin Laden family, about Usama's inheritance.

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Sent 1: After the disruption of the plot in Amman, it had not escaped notice in Washington that Hijazi had lived in California and driven a cab in Boston and that Deek was a naturalized U.S. citizen who, as Berger reminded President Clinton, had been in touch with extremists in the United States as well as abroad.
Sent 2: Before Ressam's arrest, Berger saw no need to raise a public alarm at home- although the FBI put all field offices on alert.
Sent 3: Now, following Ressam's arrest, the FBI asked for an unprecedented number of special wiretaps.
Sent 4: Both Berger andTenet told us that their impression was that more Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap requests were processed during the millennium alert than ever before.
Sent 5: The next day, writing about Ressam's arrest and links to a cell in Montreal, Berger informed the President that the FBI would advise police in the United States to step up activities but would still try to avoid undue public alarm by stressing that the government had no specific information about planned attacks.
Sent 6: At a December 22 meeting of the Small Group of principals, FBI Director Louis Freeh briefed officials from the NSC staff, CIA, and Justice on wiretaps and investigations inside the United States, including a Brooklyn entity tied to the Ressam arrest, a seemingly unreliable foreign report of possible attacks on seven U.S. cities, two Algerians detained on the Canadian border, and searches in Montreal related to a jihadist cell.
Sent 7: The Justice Department released a statement on the alert the same day.
Sent 8: Clarke's staff warned, "Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in the US are likely."
Sent 9: Clarke asked Berger to try to make sure that the domestic agencies remained alert."
Sent 10: Is there a threat to civilian aircraft?"he wrote.
Sent 11: Clarke also asked the principals in late December to discuss a foreign security service report about a Bin Laden plan to put bombs on transatlantic flights.
Sent 12: The CSG met daily.
Sent 13: Berger said that the principals met constantly.
Sent 14: Later, when asked what made her decide to ask Ressam to step out of his vehicle, Diana Dean, a Customs inspector who referred Ressam to secondary inspection, testified that it was her "training and experience."
Sent 15: It appears that the heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in Ressam's detention.
Sent 16: There was a mounting sense of public alarm.
Sent 17: The earlier Jordanian arrests had been covered in the press, and Ressam's arrest was featured on network evening news broadcasts throughout the Christmas season.
Sent 18: The FBI was more communicative during the millennium crisis than it had ever been.

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Sent 1: In early March, the administration postponed action on proposals for increasing aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks.
Sent 2: Rice noted at the time that a more wide-ranging examination of policy toward Afghanistan was needed first.
Sent 3: She wanted the review very soon.
Sent 4: Rice and others recalled the President saying, "I'm tired of swatting at flies."
Sent 5: The President reportedly also said,"I'm tired of playing defense.
Sent 6: I want to play offense.
Sent 7: I want to take the fight to the terrorists."
Sent 8: President Bush explained to us that he had become impatient.
Sent 9: He apparently had heard proposals for rolling back al Qaeda but felt that catching terrorists one by one or even cell by cell was not an approach likely to succeed in the long run.
Sent 10: At the same time, he said, he understood that policy had to be developed slowly so that diplomacy and financial and military measures could mesh with one another.
Sent 11: Hadley convened an informal Deputies Committee meeting on March 7, when some of the deputies had not yet been confirmed.
Sent 12: For the first time, Clarke's various proposals-for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks and for Predator missions-went before the group that, in the Bush NSC, would do most of the policy work.
Sent 13: Though they made no decisions on these specific proposals, Hadley apparently concluded that there should be a presidential national security policy directive (NSPD) on terrorism.
Sent 14: Clarke would later express irritation about the deputies' insistence that a strategy for coping with al Qaeda be framed within the context of a regional policy.
Sent 15: He doubted that the benefits would compensate for the time lost.
Sent 16: The administration had in fact proceeded with Principals Committee meetings on topics including Iraq and Sudan without prior contextual review, and Clarke favored moving ahead similarly with a narrow counterterrorism agenda.
Sent 17: But the President's senior advisers saw the al Qaeda problem as part of a puzzle that could not be assembled without filling in the pieces for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Sent 18: Rice deferred a Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda until the deputies had developed a new policy for their consideration.

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Sent 1: Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States.
Sent 2: Millions of men and women readied themselves for work.
Sent 3: Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City.
Sent 4: Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon.
Sent 5: Across the Potomac River, the United States Congress was back in session.
Sent 6: At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House tour.
Sent 7: In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run.
Sent 8: For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey.
Sent 9: Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine.
Sent 10: Boston: American 11 and United 175.
Sent 11: Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00 A.M. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport.
Sent 12: When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures.
Sent 13: Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft.
Sent 14: This did not hinder Atta's plans.
Sent 15: Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45.
Sent 16: Seven minutes later, Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at another terminal at Logan Airport.
Sent 17: They spoke for three minutes.
Sent 18: It would be their final conversation.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-29.txt)
Sent 1: The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic initiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government before 9/11.
Sent 2: Vice President Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom.
Sent 3: Secretary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11.
Sent 4: They discussed topics like Iraq, not al Qaeda.U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001 were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli- Palestinian violence, not about Bin Laden.
Sent 5: The confirmation of the Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process.
Sent 6: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July.
Sent 7: Though the new officials were briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, on creating a twenty-first-century military.
Sent 8: At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Sent 9: He could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary.
Sent 10: Brian Sheridan-the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon-never briefed Rumsfeld.
Sent 11: He departed on January 20; he had not been replaced by 9/11.
Sent 12: Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often in his regular meetings with Tenet.
Sent 13: He thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism.
Sent 14: But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quadrennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contingency plans.
Sent 15: He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system.
Sent 16: The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did not regard the existing plans as serious.
Sent 17: To him a real military plan to address al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries.
Sent 18: The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion of the military by reiterating the Defense Department's lead role in protecting its forces abroad.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-7.txt)
Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-10.txt)
Sent 1: While Nashiri was in Afghanistan, Nibras and Khamri saw their chance.
Sent 2: They piloted the explosives-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, made friendly gestures to crew members, and detonated the bomb.
Sent 3: Quso did not arrive at the apartment in time to film the attack.
Sent 4: Back in Afghanistan, Bin Laden anticipated U.S. military retaliation.
Sent 5: He ordered the evacuation of al Qaeda's Kandahar airport compound and fled- first to the desert area near Kabul, then to Khowst and Jalalabad, and eventually back to Kandahar.
Sent 6: In Kandahar, he rotated between five to six residences, spending one night at each residence.
Sent 7: In addition, he sent his senior advisor, Mohammed Atef, to a different part of Kandahar and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, to Kabul so that all three could not be killed in one attack.
Sent 8: There was no American strike.
Sent 9: In February 2001, a source reported that an individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to Bin Laden) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked.
Sent 10: According to the source, Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger.
Sent 11: The attack on the USS Cole galvanized al Qaeda's recruitment efforts.
Sent 12: Following the attack, Bin Laden instructed the media committee, then headed by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the attack along with images of the al Qaeda training camps and training methods; it also highlighted Muslim suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya.
Sent 13: Al Qaeda's image was very important to Bin Laden, and the video was widely disseminated.
Sent 14: Portions were aired on Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television outlets.
Sent 15: It was also disseminated among many young men in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and caused many extremists to travel to Afghanistan for training and jihad.
Sent 16: Al Qaeda members considered the video an effective tool in their struggle for preeminence among other Islamist and jihadist movements.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-6-5.txt)
Sent 1: The after-action review had treated the CIA as the lead agency for any offensive against al Qaeda, and the principals, at their March 10 meeting, had endorsed strengthening the CIA's capability for that role.
Sent 2: To the CTC, that meant proceeding with "The Plan," which it had put forward half a year earlier-hiring and training more case officers and building up the capabilities of foreign security services that provided intelligence via liaison.
Sent 3: On occasion, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against al Qaeda cells.
Sent 4: In the CTC and higher up, the CIA's managers believed that they desperately needed funds just to continue their current counterterrorism effort, for they reckoned that the millennium alert had already used up all of the Center's funds for the current fiscal year; the Bin Laden unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation.
Sent 5: Tenet told us he met with Berger to discuss funding for counterterrorism just two days after the principals' meeting.
Sent 6: While Clarke strongly favored giving the CIA more money for counterterrorism, he differed sharply with the CIA's managers about where it should come from.
Sent 7: They insisted that the CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War.
Sent 8: Their ability to perform any mission, counterterrorism included, they argued, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the beginning of the 1990s, and building from there-with across-the-board recruitment and training of new case officers, and the reopening of closed stations.
Sent 9: To finance the counterterrorism effort, Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplemental appropriation.
Sent 10: Now, in the aftermath of the millennium alert, Tenet wanted a boost in overall funds for the CIA and another supplemental appropriation specifically for counterterrorism.
Sent 11: To Clarke, this seemed evidence that the CIA's leadership did not give sufficient priority to the battle against Bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Sent 12: He told us that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, "said if there's going to be money spent on going after Bin Laden, it should be given to him.
Sent 13: My view was that he had had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it, and I didn't want to put more good money after bad."
Sent 14: The CIA had a very different attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA's Bin Laden unit did"extraordinary and commendable work," his chief of station in London "was just as much part of the al Qaeda struggle as an officer sitting in [the Bin Laden unit]."
Sent 15: The dispute had large managerial implications, for Clarke had found Ailies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-20-2.txt)
Sent 1: Military Notification and Response.
Sent 2: Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command.
Sent 3: In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility.
Sent 4: The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out.
Sent 5: At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS.
Sent 6: This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked: FAA: Hi.
Sent 7: Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here.
Sent 8: We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out.
Sent 9: NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?
Sent 10: FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.
Sent 11: NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City.
Sent 12: The air defense of America began with this call.
Sent 13: At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr.
Sent 14: After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD's Continental Region.
Sent 15: Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters.
Sent 16: General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to "go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get authorities later."
Sent 17: General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report.
Sent 18: F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base.

Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-5-10.txt)
Sent 1: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.
Sent 2: The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country.
Sent 3: Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
Sent 4: Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
Sent 5: We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999.
Sent 6: It appears they supported themselves.
Sent 7: KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
Sent 8: After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money.
Sent 9: Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky.
Sent 10: According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States.
Sent 11: Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
Sent 12: Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm.
Sent 13: We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money.
Sent 14: The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
Sent 15: By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
Sent 16: Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

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Sent 1: The Agencies Confer When they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade Center, nearly everyone in the White House told us, they immediately knew it was not an accident.
Sent 2: The Secret Service initiated a number of security enhancements around the White House complex.
Sent 3: The officials who issued these orders did not know that there were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircraft was en route to Washington.
Sent 4: These measures were precautionary steps taken because of the strikes in New York.
Sent 5: The FAA and White House Teleconferences.
Sent 6: The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30.
Sent 7: Because none of these teleconferences-at least before 10:00- included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings.
Sent 8: At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department.
Sent 9: The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks.
Sent 10: The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit.
Sent 11: Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.
Sent 12: Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.
Sent 13: At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism.
Sent 14: Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter.
Sent 15: The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40.
Sent 16: The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference-at about 9:40-was the physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies.
Sent 17: Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon.
Sent 18: We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington.

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Sent 1: In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan.
Sent 2: Rice's recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks.
Sent 3: Rice described the draft document as providing for "consolidation plus," superseding the various Clinton administration documents.
Sent 4: In fact, the CIA drafted two documents.
Sent 5: One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations.
Sent 6: Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28.
Sent 7: The CIA's notes for Tenet advised him that "in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law."
Sent 8: At the meeting, Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it.
Sent 9: Hadley accepted this argument, and the draft MON was put on hold.
Sent 10: As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an "Annex A" on intelligence activities to "eliminate the al Qaeda threat."
Sent 11: The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Laden-an armed version of the Predator drone.
Sent 12: In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute.
Sent 13: Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that they still might provide the elusive "actionable intelligence" to target Bin Laden with cruise missiles.
Sent 14: Learning that the Air Force was thinking of equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment.
Sent 15: The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes.
Sent 16: He recalled that theTaliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters.
Sent 17: Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready.
Sent 18: "I do not believe the possible recon value outweighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote.

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Sent 1: He repeatedly calls on his followers to embrace martyrdom since "The walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets."
Sent 2: For those yearning for a lost sense of order in an older, more tranquil world, he offers his "Caliphate" as an imagined alternative to today's uncertainty.
Sent 3: For others, he offers simplistic conspiracies to explain their world.
Sent 4: Bin Laden also relies heavily on the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb.
Sent 5: A member of the Muslim Brotherhood executed in 1966 on charges of attempting to overthrow the government, Qutb mixed Islamic scholarship with a very superficial acquaintance with Western history and thought.
Sent 6: Sent by the Egyptian government to study in the United States in the late 1940s, Qutb returned with an enormous loathing of Western society and history.
Sent 7: He dismissed Western achievements as entirely material, arguing that Western society possesses "nothing that will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence."
Sent 8: Three basic themes emerge from Qutb's writings.
Sent 9: First, he claimed that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition he called jahiliyya, the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the revelations given to the Prophet Mohammed).
Sent 10: Qutb argued that humans can choose only between Islam and jahiliyya.
Sent 11: Second, he warned that more people, including Muslims, were attracted to jahiliyya and its material comforts than to his view of Islam; jahiliyya could therefore triumph over Islam.
Sent 12: Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan.
Sent 13: All Muslims-as he defined them-therefore must take up arms in this fight.
Sent 14: Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of destruction.
Sent 15: Bin Laden shares Qutb's stark view, permitting him and his followers to rationalize even unprovoked mass murder as righteous defense of an embattled faith.
Sent 16: Many Americans have wondered, "Why do 'they' hate us?"
Sent 17: Some also ask, "What can we do to stop these attacks?"
Sent 18: Bin Laden and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions.

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Sent 1: While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds.
Sent 2: Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
Sent 3: As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."
Sent 4: In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban.
Sent 5: In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
Sent 6: Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
Sent 7: He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden.
Sent 8: They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan."
Sent 9: President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
Sent 10: The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
Sent 11: The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
Sent 12: Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
Sent 13: But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
Sent 14: His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
Sent 15: At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden.
Sent 16: President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden."
Sent 17: I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two."
Sent 18: The U.S. effort continued.

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Sent 1: Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft.
Sent 2: It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.
Sent 3: After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport.
Sent 4: Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.
Sent 5: Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack.
Sent 6: NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.
Sent 7: The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too.
Sent 8: During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft.
Sent 9: The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.
Sent 10: NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it.
Sent 11: The flight never turned off its transponder.
Sent 12: NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland.
Sent 13: But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.
Sent 14: United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness.
Sent 15: At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller.
Sent 16: This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.
Sent 17: Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin."
Sent 18: The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.

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Sent 1: The CIA's senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to minimize.
Sent 2: One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money.
Sent 3: A Predator cost about $3 million.
Sent 4: If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force, but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went down.
Sent 5: Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed.
Sent 6: Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator."
Sent 7: This was new ground,"he told us.
Sent 8: Tenet ticked off key questions: What is the chain of command?
Sent 9: Who takes the shot?
Sent 10: Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control?
Sent 11: Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency's executive director, A. B." Buzzy" Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had no authority to do it, nor did he.
Sent 12: Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work.
Sent 13: It had been built to hit tanks, not people.
Sent 14: It needed to be designed to explode in a different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision.
Sent 15: In the configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator's missile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle.
Sent 16: White House officials had seen the Predator video of the "man in white."
Sent 17: On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system.
Sent 18: He directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1.

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Sent 1: Bin Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America.
Sent 2: The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.
Sent 3: Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters.
Sent 4: KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live.
Sent 5: The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough.
Sent 6: They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time.
Sent 7: The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11.
Sent 8: General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan.
Sent 9: Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time.
Sent 10: The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations.
Sent 11: For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance.
Sent 12: Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda.
Sent 13: In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year-a significant sum, to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad.
Sent 14: Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994.
Sent 15: The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale.
Sent 16: This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune.
Sent 17: Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda.
Sent 18: When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets.

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Sent 1: Zakariya Essabar, a Moroccan citizen, moved to Germany in February 1997 and to Hamburg in 1998, where he studied medical technology.
Sent 2: Soon after moving to Hamburg, Essabar met Binalshibh and the others through a Turkish mosque.
Sent 3: Essabar turned extremist fairly suddenly, probably in 1999, and reportedly pressured one acquaintance with physical force to become more religious, grow a beard, and compel his wife to convert to Islam.
Sent 4: Essabar's parents were said to have made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to sway him from this lifestyle.
Sent 5: Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, he would travel to Afghanistan to communicate the date for the attacks to the al Qaeda leadership.
Sent 6: Mounir el Motassadeq, another Moroccan, came to Germany in 1993, moving to Hamburg two years later to study electrical engineering at theTechnical University.
Sent 7: A witness has recalled Motassadeq saying that he would kill his entire family if his religious beliefs demanded it.
Sent 8: One of Motassadeq's roommates recalls him referring to Hitler as a "good man" and organizing film sessions that included speeches by Bin Laden.
Sent 9: Motassadeq would help conceal the Hamburg group's trip to Afghanistan in late 1999.
Sent 10: Abdelghani Mzoudi, also a Moroccan, arrived in Germany in the summer of 1993, after completing university courses in physics and chemistry.
Sent 11: Mzoudi studied in Dortmund, Bochum, and Muenster before moving to Hamburg in 1995.
Sent 12: Mzoudi described himself as a weak Muslim when he was home in Morocco, but much more devout when he was back in Hamburg.
Sent 13: In April 1996, Mzoudi and Motassadeq witnessed the execution of Atta's will.
Sent 14: During the course of 1999, Atta and his group became ever more extreme and secretive, speaking only in Arabic to conceal the content of their conversations.
Sent 15: 87 When the four core members of the Hamburg cell left Germany to journey to Afghanistan late that year, it seems unlikely that they already knew about the planes operation; no evidence connects them to al Qaeda before that time.
Sent 16: Witnesses have attested, however, that their pronouncements reflected ample predisposition toward taking some action against the United States.
Sent 17: In short, they fit the bill for Bin Laden, Atef, and KSM.
Sent 18: Going to Afghanistan The available evidence indicates that in 1999, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah decided to fight in Chechnya against the Russians.

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Sent 1: Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional.
Sent 2: Congress should address this problem.
Sent 3: We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one.
Sent 4: A single committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another.
Sent 5: The new committee or committees should conduct continuing studies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate.
Sent 6: We have already recommended that the total level of funding for intelligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secretary of defense.
Sent 7: We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the budget.
Sent 8: The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure should grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees.
Sent 9: The majority party's representation on this committee should never exceed the minority's representation by more than one.
Sent 10: Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees should be a member who also serves on each of the following additional committees: Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee.
Sent 11: In this way the other major congressional interests can be brought together in the new committee's work.
Sent 12: Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees, without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise.
Sent 13: The committees should be smaller-perhaps seven or nine members in each house-so that each member feels a greater sense of responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work.
Sent 14: The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees of Congress.
Sent 15: One expert witness (not a member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development.
Sent 16: The one attempt to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, may be eliminated.
Sent 17: The Senate does not have even this.
Sent 18: Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security.