Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-23.txt)
Sent 1: According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position.
Sent 2: The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10.
Sent 3: As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east-where the aircraft was now heading.
Sent 4: Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.
Sent 5: In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around.
Sent 6: By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west.
Sent 7: Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets.
Sent 8: American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C. By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center.
Sent 9: They knew American 77 was lost.
Sent 10: At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes."
Sent 11: Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount.
Sent 12: A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stop."
Sent 13: While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.
Sent 14: The Command Center kept looking for American 77.
Sent 15: At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets.
Sent 16: At 9:32, they found one.
Sent 17: Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan National Airport.
Sent 18: FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service.
Question: By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center and they knew what was missing? (true/0)
Question: What was ordered at the Command Center at 9:25? (false/1)
Question: The Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles were urged to have their controllers look for primary targets and they found one at what time? (false/2)
Question: Which officials knew there was a highjacker aboard (false/3)
Question: At 9:32, what did they find? (true/4)
Question: What caused concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount? (true/5)
Question: What target crossed into Washington Center's airspace at 9:10? (true/6)
Question: At which times did all this take place (true/7)
Question: Why didn't the Indianapolis Center notice Flight 77 turn around? (true/8)
Question: How long did American 77 stay on the Indianapolis Center Radar? (false/9)
Question: What target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10. (true/10)
Question: When did Dulles detect a primary target that triggered them to alert Reagan National Airport? (true/11)
Question: What was one of the mistakes besides the air traffic control search that lead to America 77 flying for 36 min. undetected? (false/12)
Question: Who notified the secret service (true/13)
Question: Which commandments went searching for American 77 (true/14)
Last updated: Mon Apr 16 04:55:33 EDT 2018
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