Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-1-30.txt)
Sent 1: Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols.
Sent 2: It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction.
Sent 3: As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth.
Sent 4: We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities.
Sent 5: NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew.
Sent 6: Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.
Sent 7: More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response.
Sent 8: Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources.
Sent 9: In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning.
Sent 10: In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA.
Sent 11: This statement was incorrect.
Sent 12: There was no hijack to report at 9:16.
Sent 13: United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.
Sent 14: In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77.
Sent 15: This statement was also incorrect.
Sent 16: The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both.
Sent 17: These statements were incorrect as well.
Sent 18: The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.