Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-13.1-38.txt)
Sent 1: Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional.
Sent 2: Congress should address this problem.
Sent 3: We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one.
Sent 4: A single committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another.
Sent 5: The new committee or committees should conduct continuing studies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate.
Sent 6: We have already recommended that the total level of funding for intelligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secretary of defense.
Sent 7: We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the budget.
Sent 8: The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure should grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees.
Sent 9: The majority party's representation on this committee should never exceed the minority's representation by more than one.
Sent 10: Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees should be a member who also serves on each of the following additional committees: Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee.
Sent 11: In this way the other major congressional interests can be brought together in the new committee's work.
Sent 12: Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees, without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise.
Sent 13: The committees should be smaller-perhaps seven or nine members in each house-so that each member feels a greater sense of responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work.
Sent 14: The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees of Congress.
Sent 15: One expert witness (not a member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development.
Sent 16: The one attempt to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, may be eliminated.
Sent 17: The Senate does not have even this.
Sent 18: Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security.
Question: What are two alternatives that Congress have considered? (true/0)
Question: In what way can other congressional interests can be brought together (true/1)
Question: Who should address Congressional Oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism? (true/2)
Question: What are some suggestions for requirements of the people in this new committee that is being proposed? (true/3)
Question: What would be the results of reducing intelligence committee sizes? (false/4)
Question: Who should address dysfunctional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism (true/5)
Question: What is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development (false/6)
Question: In what ways is it recommended that the new committee could be more transparent? (false/7)
Question: What are some recommendations for fixing the dysfunctional way congressional oversight for intelligence and counter-terrorism are run right now? (false/8)
Question: What is the recommendation for the term and size of the commitee? (false/9)
Question: What are some of the problems Homeland Security faces right now? (false/10)
Last updated: Mon Apr 16 04:55:33 EDT 2018
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