Paragraph: (Sept11-reports/oanc-chapter-3-7.txt)
Sent 1: After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options.
Sent 2: The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it.
Sent 3: For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Laden.
Sent 4: On August 22, the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue with the United States on Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan.
Sent 5: Meeting in Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Taliban delegates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but asked what would happen to Bin Laden should he be sent to Saudi Arabia.
Sent 6: Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Laden, the Taliban leader said no.
Sent 7: Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government.
Sent 8: Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime.
Sent 9: (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late September.
Sent 10: His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received independently.
Sent 11: Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelligence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi custody.
Sent 12: The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained.
Sent 13: Several officials told us, in particular, that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi government in 1997.67Though U.S. officials repeatedly raised the issue, the Saudis provided limited information.
Sent 14: In his September 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Vice President Gore, while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness, renewed the request for direct U.S. access to Tayyib.
Sent 15: The United States never obtained this access.
Sent 16: An NSC staff-led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see "if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent individuals in Saudi Arabia, including especially the Bin Laden family."
Sent 17: One result was two NSC-led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000.
Sent 18: During these trips the NSC, Treasury, and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials, and later interviewed members of the Bin Laden family, about Usama's inheritance.